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brief · 2026

Judicial independence under reform pressure

By Hanan Al-Mansouri

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Abstract

What the paper covers

Judicial independence is not a static property of a constitutional system but a relationship that must be maintained against the pressure of ordinary politics. This Brief examines three structural features that condition that maintenance, and notes the patterns by which judicial-reform agendas have, in various jurisdictions, hollowed out independence under the language of reform.

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Full text

Full text and method

Independence as relationship, not property

Judicial independence is often described as a property of a constitutional system — present or absent, robust or weak. The framing obscures more than it clarifies. Independence is better understood as a relationship that must be actively maintained against the ordinary pressure of politics.

Three structural features

Three structural features condition the maintenance of that relationship: appointment processes that insulate selection from ordinary partisan dynamics; tenure and removal protections that make political reprisal costly; and budgetary independence that prevents financial pressure from substituting for direct intervention.

Reform agendas under examination

The Brief surveys recent judicial-reform agendas across several jurisdictions, identifying the structural features each agenda alters and the trajectory of independence in the years following implementation.

The pattern is consistent: reforms that compress the three structural features — by collapsing appointment review, shortening tenure, or routing budget through political channels — tend to produce measurable shifts in judicial behaviour within five years.

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